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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Yel'tsin vs. Primakov 
Such a vote of confidence! The president has declared Primakov "useful to us," 
well at least for now, as Yel'tsin added "later we'll see." (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 
Combined Reports, 10 Apr 99) Primakov is piqued, but he can rest comfortably 
(his bout of sciatica notwithstanding), knowing that he has a solid, well-
constructed hand to play in the current political crisis. 
 
While Yel'tsin has recently been characterized as striking back after his latest 
illness, his victories may well be short-lived. Yes, he suspended Skuratov, 
sacked Bordyuzha and replaced Primakov with Chernomyrdin as his chief Balkan 
negotiator. Yel'tsin even appeared on television to assure his public (foreign and 
domestic) that his health problems were over. (CNN HEADLINE NEWS, 22 Apr 
99) Resubmitting the Skuratov dismissal to the Federation Council, Yel'tsin 
seemed to signal that he had worked his magic and had the governors back on 
his side. 
 
That move was apparently a bluff. On 21 April, the Federation Council voted 79 
to 61 once again to reject Yel'tsin's recommendation for dismissal. (AP NEWS, 
21 Apr 99, 1533 PDT; clari.net) If the first council vote signaled support for a 
beleaguered prosecutor, this vote suggests open defiance. The Kremlin 
response will determine just how intense this political struggle will get; however, 
the regional leaders clearly doubt that Yel'tsin can make yet another comeback. 
While there is a great deal of speculation on the next move, the question of 
Yel'tsin's ability to carry through a dismissal of his prime minister or disbandment 
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of the Duma would seem to curtail his options and therein lies Primakov's 
strength. Would Primakov succeed if he refused to be removed? 
 
APPARAT 
Is there method in this madness? 
President Yel'tsin's nearly constant ill health since 1996 has forced a greater 
reliance on his Kremlin advisers and staff, but changes introduced to apparat 
policy have brought into question just who is running the Kremlin show and how 
did they get there. Prior to 1996, the apparat was already a secretive operation, 
with subtle signs of internal struggle and intrigue, but few open attacks. It was, 
above all, protective of the president. The 1996 elections changed all that. After 
the elections, Anatoli Chubais took control of the Kremlin and, despite early 
dodges regarding the president's health (remember his "colossal fatigue"?), 
came clean about the president's condition, launching both the open and the 
backroom campaigns to succeed Yel'tsin. 
 
The early criteria established for leadership in the apparat cadres were 
"professionalism" and loyalty to Yel'tsin. The emphasis on professionalism was, 
in part, a means to deflect criticism from the democratic camp when former 
Soviet bureaucrats and hard-liners were permitted into Yel'tsin's political elite. 
Some were, however, quite effective managers and advisers. The loyalty 
requirement reflected the long-standing "us versus them" mentality, with the 
enemy periodically redefined as the Communists, the anti-reformers, the 
Khasbulatov Supreme Soviet, the red-brown coalition, and finally the 
Communists again. 
 
Lately it seems that professionalism has been jettisoned in favor of loyalty, and 
loyalty to whom is now the central question. Chubais' stewardship of the Kremlin 
was marked by the turnover of personnel as many of Chubais' St. Petersburg 
colleagues replaced longtime Yel'tsin functionaries. 
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While Chubais exercised firm control throughout the course of Yel'tsin's heart 
surgery and recovery, his tenure -- wedded as it was to the protection of 
privatization and Western investment -- replaced and alienated several of the 
diverse groups of advisers Yel'tsin characteristically included in his circle. While 
that was certainly, at times, a positive result, it did force the ousters of some 
strong Yel'tsin loyalists. Chubais also oversaw, or perhaps simply acknowledged, 
the ascendancy of Tatiana Dyachenko as primary conduit of information to and 
from the president. 
 
Her importance remained undiminished through the administration of Sergei 
Yastrzhembsky. Two key components distinguish the Chubais/Yastrzhembsky 
years: the continuing debilitating illness of the president and the increase in 
importance of the government as the protector of the reform process. The 
Kremlin staff, when not actively supporting the government in its reforms, served 
primarily to relay messages from an isolated president. 
 
The devaluation of the ruble in August 1998 provoked a marked decline in 
apparat personnel policy. After a bruising battle with the Duma over the 
appointment of a prime minister, Yel'tsin sacked Yastrzhembsky, apparently for 
his support of Luzhkov as a PM candidate. Valentin Yumashev, who assisted 
Yel'tsin in writing his memoirs, was elevated to the post of chief of staff. 
 
Yumashev, a longtime Yel'tsin family friend and close ally of Dyachenko, seemed 
remarkably ill-suited to organize the work of the powerful Kremlin bureaucracy. 
As a recent Moskovsky komsomolets article (6 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0406) 
relates, Yumashev "paid absolutely no attention to the structures directly under 
his subordination." The security organs in particular suffered from Yumashev's 
inattention as critical edicts on appointments which required "the president's 
urgent signature would lie around the Kremlin for three or four months." 
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It is unlikely that concern over Yumashev's inept management led to his 
dismissal (or was his resignation simply accepted?). Yel'tsin, returning to the 
Kremlin after another bout of illness, may have fired Yumashev just to prove he 
was back in charge. (See Nemtsov interview in PERSPECTIVE, January-
February 99, for his comments on this.) 
 
In turn, General Nikolai Bordyuzha was appointed to take charge in the Kremlin, 
in addition to his duties leading the Security Council. What exactly were the 
criteria applied to that decision? Yel'tsin had been ill, so it is unlikely that he had 
the time to take the full measure of the general's character, work ethic or loyalty. 
Perhaps, in the brief honeymoon between the Kremlin and the Primakov 
government, Yel'tsin accepted a prime ministerial recommendation on the 
appointment. 
 
Now, in the fury of the current Kremlin upheaval and general political crisis, 
Bordyuzha has been removed in favor of Aleksandr Voloshin. Was Bordyuzha 
removed for his support of Primakov, his bungling of the procurator general's 
resignation, or was he recognized just to be the wrong man for the job? Perhaps 
more importantly, should Boris Nikolaevich be wondering where Sergei Filatov or 
Viktor Ilyushin have gone? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Sarah Miller 
 
Russia stays out of Yugoslav armed conflict... 
A month of NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia has proven that early Russian 
saber rattling was simply a combination of moral support for the Serbs and fiery 
rhetoric for domestic consumption. In fact, the Yel'tsin government continues to 
distance itself from any hint of military involvement in the Balkans and has 
reinvigorated attempts for a diplomatic solution with the appointment of Victor 
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Chernomyrdin as special envoy to Yugoslavia. (NTV, 0800 GMT, 19 Apr 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0419) While there has been some conflicting information flowing 
from the Yel'tsin government, the Duma and the Federation Council concerning 
the exact level of militancy in Moscow (most notably the "misunderstanding" 
about retargeting nuclear weapons at NATO countries), the Kremlin has been 
quick to set the record straight (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1240 GMT, 9 Apr 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0409), highlighting its dove-like approach to the crisis. Indeed 
official Moscow has continually emphasized its desire to remain outside the 
military conflict, however, the Russian government has not missed an opportunity 
to attack NATO and its actions in the Balkans. Although such attacks are clearly 
designed to weaken NATO's position and are often accompanied with warnings 
of a larger war in Europe, it appears as though Yel'tsin is not prepared to risk the 
future of Europe and all of Russia on his Balkan "ally." 
 
Continues diplomatic attack on NATO... 
Stating that NATO has violated the 1997 NATO-Russia accord by attacking 
Yugoslavia, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that Russia will "have 
nothing to say to NATO... as long as the intervention against Yugoslavia 
continues." (AFP North European Service, 0915 GMT, 18 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0418) These anti-NATO statements from the Yel'tsin government are only 
the latest in an ongoing attempt to isolate and fracture the Atlantic alliance. 
Earlier in the month, after over a week of NATO bombings, Ivanov reiterated 
Moscow's call for a new security system in Europe, emphasizing an expanded 
role for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 0954 GMT, 8 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0408) It appears as 
though Ivanov is attempting to use the latest crisis in the Balkans to highlight 
NATO's ineffectiveness in resolving conflict in Europe. Ivanov's latest attack was 
that NATO violated the precept of the NATO-Russian accord "that neither of the 
parties would use force in Europe." (AFP North European Service, 0915 GMT, 18 
Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0418) These attacks clearly serve to strengthen 
Moscow's long-pursued goal to subordinate NATO to the OSCE. 
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...But leaves the door open, just in case 
While Yel'tsin and his senior ministers have continually attacked NATO, they 
have not completely turned their backs on the 50-year-old alliance. Russian 
foreign ministry statements have clearly supported a peaceful resolution to the 
Kosovo crisis, stating that the "actions of NATO... are a blatant violation of the 
UN charter." (AGENCE FRANCE- PRESSE, 1329 GMT, 21 Apr 99; nexis) but 
have fallen far short of calling for the destruction of the alliance. While Moscow 
has recalled its senior representative to NATO and has refused to attend the 
NATO 50th anniversary celebrations in Washington, almost the entire Russian 
contingent remains at NATO's headquarters in Brussels. (DEFENSE NEWS, 19 
Apr 99) This provides a clear indication that Moscow has not discounted NATO's 
post-Kosovo role in Europe. Apart from ensuring Russia's future contact with 
NATO (which translates to Partnership for Peace dollars), a Russian presence in 
NATO's headquarters during Operation Allied Force serves Moscow by providing 
liaison for diplomatic solutions and as a significant source of information for the 
Russian intelligence services. 
 
Planes, trains, and tanks? 
Russia owes the ROK $1.47 billion -- $1 billion of which was received in cash -- 
from a 1991 loan. The loan should have been paid in 1998, and only nine years 
after Russia and the ROK established diplomatic relations, the Koreans would 
like their money back. While the Russians proposed to offset the debt with 
commodities, the economic crisis and Russia's worldwide debts have made 
repayment difficult, if not impossible. Negotiations have yielded little more than 
Russian proposals to barter themselves out of debt, and repeated Korean 
requests for the money. At meetings in early April, the Korean government 
neither accepted nor rejected a Russian proposal to make payment in military 
equipment, including a helicopter, tanks and infantry vehicles. However, at 
subsequent meetings, the Koreans grabbed the opportunity for at least partial 
repayment in raw materials or weapons. (YONHAP, 0026 GMT, 9 Apr 99; FBIS-
 7 
EAS-99-0408) With the 10th anniversary of Russo-Korean diplomatic relations in 
sight, the momentum seems to be gearing up to push through a solution, even if 
it means calling the $470 million a loss. Conclusion of the negotiations will 
facilitate anniversary celebration plans, including South Korean President Kim 
Dae-Jung's visit to Russia next year and the inauguration of the "new 
partnership" status of Russian-Korean relations. (YONHAP, 0018 GMT, 9 Apr 99; 
FBIS-SOV-99-0408) 
 
I'm not coming to your house to play! 
Amidst the newest squabble over the Kurile Islands negotiations, President Boris 
Yel'tsin has decided not to visit Japan this spring. Neither will negotiations take 
place in late April. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 7 Apr 99) Instead, Yel'tsin's old "friend," 
former Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, will travel to Moscow to 
hold one of the informal "no jackets" meetings that reinvigorated Russo-
Japanese relations in 1997. The Russo-Japanese negotiations have been at a 
halt for almost a year and a half, despite the signing of the Moscow Declaration 
last autumn. The declaration simply created two intergovernmental committees 
charged with negotiating the peace treaty and territorial issue. In April 1999 the 
process remains stymied by the uncompromising attitude adopted by both sides 
at the negotiation table. Nor were these discussions expedited by the 
announcement of US-Japan Defense Pact implementation measures. Mr. 
Hashimoto's visit appears to be a last-ditch effort by the Japanese, who have 
pledged that the issue will be resolved by 2000. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
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Yabloko places partition of Kosovo before Belgrade 
It may never be known exactly what Prime Minister Primakov said to Yugoslav 
President Milosevic, but Yabloko's Grigori Yavlinsky provides a hint. Apparently 
Moscow has suggested that Milosevic may keep part of Kosovo. In an interview, 
Yavlinsky said he drafted a peace plan that began with a partition. 
 
"We have drawn upa plan and handed it to the foreign minister, and, judging by 
the information available to us, some of its provisions were possibly discussed 
there. For example, the division of Kosovo into northern and southern Kosovo, 
the introduction of such troops under the auspices of the OSCE." (RUSSIA TV, 
1640 GMT, 30 Mar 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) 
 
NATO is demanding that Milosevic withdraw from Kosovo entirely, but the 
statement by the liberal flank of the Moscow establishment, let alone the 
communists and nationalists, suggests that this might not be necessary. Russia 
stands ready to defend his right to some of Kosovo. And considering that by 
NATO's own admission Russia must be part of the negotiated endgame, 
Russia's position should be given serious consideration. 
 
Simply, NATO seems to be operating under the assumption that Milosevic will 
surrender (more or less unconditionally, for this is the only way the alliance's 
rather unrealistic and contradictory series of demands makes any sense) and the 
country will return to the status quo ante bellum, refurbished with a few cosmetic 
changes. In the classic blindness to reality that often accompanies moral 
crusades, NATO does not realize that Yavlinsky may have done the alliance a 
favor. The very fact that Kosovo is more or less depopulated, and the refugees 
are terrified to return under the Yugoslav flag, suggests that all or part of Kosovo 
needs to be effectively separated from the federation, or that the regime in 
Belgrade has to be changed. The former is more possible. 
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In a shocking display of ignorance of their own history, paradoxically from the 
very wellspring the present action is putatively drawn, NATO members do not 
see that long-term peace in the Balkans cannot come from an imposed 
settlement devoid of on-the-ground reality. For this high-handed illusion we can 
thank the United States, which has never quite understood that stability at all 
costs can be quite unstable and that what is right and good does not always 
accord with what is viable and possible. Sometimes the good guy gets shot. The 
Europeans should know better. 
 
So by Yavlinsky suggesting that Kosovo be split down the middle, both sides can 
claim victory, refugees can go home, and Russian Prime Minister Primakov can 
accept the Nobel Peace Prize, perhaps only minutes before he is sworn in as the 
next Russian president. 
 
Russian premier is the country's most popular politician 
In a recent poll, Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov's popularity rating moved up to 
28 percent from 24 percent last November. This may be because of his recent 
diplomatic appearance in Belgrade. Next on the list is Gennadi Zyuganov and 
Grigori Yavlinsky, with 18 percent apiece. Yavlinsky is pulling high numbers 
because of his clean record and continuous opposition to everything and 
everyone in power. Zyuganov, almost always in the top three or four politicians 
mentioned, should theoretically poll better considering that he heads the largest, 
and perhaps only true political party in the nation. Zyuganov's numbers are down 
from 20 percent since November. Next in line is Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov at 
17 percent (up 1 percent from November), and Krasnoyarsk Region Governor 
Aleksandr Lebed with 11 percent (down from 17 percent in November). 
 
In the single digits, ex-Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko garnered 6 percent (3 
percent in November); leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky: 6 percent (unchanged); State Duma speaker Gennadi Seleznev: 5 
percent (6 percent); former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov: 4 percent 
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(unchanged); governor of the Kemerovo region Aman Tuleev: 3 percent (2 
percent); leader of the Popular Rule party Nikolai Ryzhkov: 3 percent (2 percent); 
leader of Russia is Our Home (NDR) Viktor Chernomyrdin: 3 percent 
(unchanged); and Federation Council speaker Yegor Stroev: 2 percent. 
(INTERFAX, 1636 GMT, 2 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0402) 
 
PROCURACY 
Prosecutor general's saga continues 
There have been three developments in the last few weeks. First, Prosecutor 
General Skuratov initially claimed that his raid and confiscation of papers in the 
Kremlin last month was conducted in conjunction with the Swiss Prosecutor 
General Carla del Ponte's investigation of the Swiss company Mabetex. 
Apparently Del Ponte has denied an investigation is underway. Why Skuratov 
said this is anybody's guess. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1356 GMT, 5 Apr 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0405) 
 
Second, President Yel'tsin, rebuffed by the Federation Council in his attempt to 
remove Skuratov, temporarily dismissed Skuratov due to a criminal case filed 
against the prosecutor for abuse of office. The Federation Council's consent is 
required to remove the prosecutor general pursuant to Article 102(h) of the 
Russian Constitution, and Yel'tsin's enemies have taken advantage of the 
opportunity to oppose his firing of Skuratov. 
 
The third development stems from, and has implications for, the workings of the 
prosecutor general's office. Although Skuratov was effectively placed under 
house arrest on 2 April, and a temporary replacement (Yuri Chaka) had been 
named, the prosecutor general's office managed to issue a warrant on 6 April for 
the two oligarchs and bankrollers of Yel'tsin's last bid for the presidency, Boris 
Berezovsky and Aleksandr Smolensky. Russia now enjoys the unique position of 
having two prosecutors general -- one appointed by Yel'tsin, but not confirmed by 
the Federation Council, and one rejected by Yel'tsin, but accepted by the 
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Federation Council. Both prosecutors, apparently, are issuing arrest warrants, 
each gunning for the other side's people. It might be argued that if one 
prosecutor general is good, two must be better. However, all that will be 
accomplished is only another stain on the name of the federal government and 
yet another reason for the regions to distance themselves from Moscow and its 
intrigues. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 1322 GMT, 6 Apr 99; nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By CDR Fred Drummond 
 
Sailing away 
The Russian Navy was the subject of a great deal of press reports during most of 
the month of April. Receiving the most coverage in the West were the on-again, 
off-again reports of Russian warships sailing towards the Adriatic in response to 
NATO's Operation Allied Force. Less notice was paid by the major US dailies to 
the numerous exercises conducted by the Russian Navy in its own home waters. 
 
The Adriatic Sea or bust 
One week into NATO's air war against Serbia, Russian Defense Minister Igor 
Sergeev stated that "one warship" from the Black Sea Fleet would sail for the 
Mediterranean, and as many as six other ships were being prepared to do the 
same. This news item led off an article in the Boston Globe that described overall 
Russian reaction to the events in the Balkans. (BOSTON GLOBE, 1 Apr 99) 
Numerous press releases from various Russian media sources then followed 
over the next two weeks. From the tone of the early articles, it appeared that 
several warships might be joining the intelligence-gathering vessel (spy ship, or 
AGI, in Cold War terminology) Liman, which had apparently already commenced 
its trip to the Adriatic. (See Editorial Digest, 5 April 99.) The Liman was reported 
to have arrived in theater during the first week of April. 
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One interesting article appeared in Komsomol'skaya pravda. In the reporter's 
view, the news that seven Russian warships from the Black Sea were being 
prepared to sail for the Adriatic caused "almost panic" amongst the NATO allies. 
The article closed on a more considered tone, though. It noted that the numerous 
Russian naval activities scheduled or underway from the North Sea to the Pacific 
may divert NATO "spaceborne reconnaissance forces" (spy satellites, in Cold 
War terminology) from concentrating primarily on the Adriatic. Whether the US 
rates the Russian fleet of today so high on its interest list, we cannot say. It is a 
good approach, though, by the Russians to try to provide some support for the 
Serbs by tying up valuable assets. The paper acknowledges that this is the only 
way Russia can help out Yugoslavia militarily. (KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 
2-9 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0427) Then, the waffling on any warships sailing out 
of area began. 
 
By 13 April, Sergeev was quoted, through an Interfax report, that only two 
warships were expected to travel to the Adriatic. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 13 Apr 
99; The Washington Post On-line) In the event, it appears that warships were 
never really "expected" to sail to that region, as on 15 April an unnamed Russian 
defense ministry official stated that no Black Sea Fleet vessels were set to travel 
"anytime soon." (INTERFAX, 1148 GMT, 15 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0415) 
However, that did not mean that the Russian Navy was sitting idle in the various 
ports. 
 
All of the talk of the Russian Navy presenting a presence in the war zone was, of 
course, taking place in the larger context of overall Russian reaction and 
dissatisfaction with NATO's operation. This included the brief flurry of excitement 
when President Boris Yel'tsin apparently threatened NATO countries with the 
retargeting of Russian ICBMs back to their Cold War coordinates, and comments 
by various Russian politicians that a NATO ground war in Yugoslavia could lead 
to a third world war. The naval aspect was just one side of a many-faceted 
Russian approach to "counter" NATO and provide support, of whatever means, 
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to the FRY. Sharing intelligence with Yugoslavia and having Russian warships 
"showing the flag" in the Adriatic are methods of supporting Yugoslavia and 
opposing NATO, while at the same time not taking actions so drastic that 
Western dollars would stop flowing into Russia. 
 
As a reminder, some ongoing US assistance efforts to Russia include 18,000 
metric tons of wheat being shipped to Vladivostok, and the continuing work of the 
Nunn-Lugar program to help Russians reduce their inventory of nuclear 
weapons. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 17 Apr 99; The Washington Post On-line, and 
BOSTON GLOBE, 20 Apr 99) Also expected are further IMF loans. The saber 
rattling, or in our case make that anchor rattling, is somewhat understandable, 
and is entirely in line with the typical Russian modus operandi. This is especially 
true today in Russia, where no politician can afford to be regarded as too pro-
Western, but no one in the government is willing to see a reduction of incoming 
dollars. 
 
Fleets at sea 
The Russian armed forces have not seen increased budgets, alleviated the 
increasingly harsh living conditions that its members struggle under, or received 
all of the outstanding back wages. Nonetheless, the Russian Navy has sent its 
Northern, Black Sea, Baltic, and Pacific fleets on exercises during April. The 
Northern Fleet finished a relatively large-scaled exercise in early April. The 
Pacific Fleet participated in maneuvers with ground and air forces around the 
same time frame. The Baltic Fleet undertook exercises mid-month, with around 
40 vessels participating. (ITAR-TASS, 1 Apr 99; nexis) This is an interesting 
figure, though if true, is not indicative of credible combat capability. The Baltic 
Fleet comprises only six destroyers/frigates, around 30 patrol craft, and 
numerous smaller vessels. The three fleets conducted further large-scale 
exercises near the end of the month, with more combined land-sea-air operations 
and ship-borne missile firings taking place. The Black Sea Fleet's 10-day 
 14 
exercise was scheduled to undertake joint maneuvers with Ukraine's navy. 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 23 Apr 99; nexis) 
 
What does this all mean? According to the Nezavisimaya gazeta article, the 
naval exercises' "aim is to unambiguously warn the US and NATO authorities 
about Moscow's resoluteness to sternly and adequately react to possible threats 
and challenges to its security after the adoption of NATO's new strategic concept 
stipulating the expansion of its zone of responsibility to a global scale." Apart 
from "demonstrating" that Russia's navy is still a viable force, and one with which 
others may have to interact, the pertinent question is: What cost to day-to-day 
operations and maintainability did these exercises exact? An Associated Press 
report (on Russian combat aircraft procurement) put the matter in perfect context, 
stating "Russia remains a nuclear superpower, but its conventional forces are 
barely capable of feeding their troops, much less fighting a war." (ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, 20 Apr 99; The Washington Post On-line) Western observers are not 
forecasting a return to Soviet naval Cold War capabilities anytime soon, no 
matter how many ships, of various sizes, go to sea for short periods of time. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Where in the world is Boris Berezovsky? 
Boris Berezovsky is finally back in Moscow now that he is no longer a wanted 
man. Since he heard the news of his replacement, he'd been spending time in 
France and Kyiv. Upon his arrival in Moscow on 19 April, Berezovsky denied any 
wrongdoing -- he's charged with money-laundering and corruption -- denounced 
Primakov, and promptly went to the hospital claiming back pains. In light of the 
previous month's events -- being sacked from his post, denied access to the CIS 
Heads of State meeting, berated by Primakov, and faced with an arrest warrant -- 
Berezovsky's pains, whether physical or metaphorical, have been sharp. 
 15 
Berezovsky remained in France until the prosecutor general's office dropped the 
warrant for his arrest. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 19 Apr 99) 
 
Berezovsky may be out, but his plan lives on 
The results of the 2 April CIS Heads of State Summit have finally become clear. 
Judging by Yel'tsin's closing remarks at the meeting, Berezovsky seems to have 
left a small but indelible mark on the CIS reorganization and integration process. 
Although his plans for an Executive Committee led by a strengthened executive 
secretary were not adopted, his streamlining suggestions were. (See Editorial 
Digest, 9 December 1998.) As a result, funding and personnel for the new 
executive committee were drastically decreased. In total, CIS central body staff 
was cut from 2,500 to 700. (Jamestown Foundation PRISM, 9 Apr 99) The 
Executive Committee, which has legally taken over the duties of the Executive 
Secretariat, the Interstate Economic Committee, and the nine intergovernmental 
committees of the commonwealth, is headed by newly appointed Chairman of 
the Executive Committee Yuri Yarov. Among his first acts as executive chairman, 
Yarov stressed that reorganization will continue with the understanding that the 
CIS Executive Committee shall not have supranational powers or exceed a total 
of 710 staff members. (ITAR-TASS, 1715 GMT, 7 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-99-0408) 
The CIS Interparliamentary Assembly (IPA) -- newly joined by Ukraine -- 
supported the heads of state reorganization decisions at the IPA meeting in St. 
Petersburg only one day after the summit.  
 
Despite their reorganization successes, the heads of state were unable to 
prevent the withdrawal of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia from the 
Collective Security Treaty, although Russia attempted to broker a last-minute 
deal with Georgia over Abkhazia. (INTERFAX, 0916 GMT, 19 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-
99-0419) The deal would have repatriated Georgian refugees to Abkhazia in an 
effort to reverse some of the Russian-sponsored expulsions of Georgians in 
1993. Despite the warm welcome that Yel'tsin extended to Shevardnadze at the 
summit, Georgia only agreed to extend the Russian peacekeepers' presence to 2 
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April 1999 ex post facto and Russia signed a series of documents that simply 
restated Georgian sovereignty. This was not enough to make the Georgian side 
reconsider withdrawal. 
 
GUAM+U 
On the heels of the Georgian, Azeri, and Uzbek withdrawals from the CIS 
Collective Security Treaty, Shevardnadze also announced that the GUAM 
alliance (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) would expand to include 
Uzbekistan. (RFE/FL NEWSLINE, 20 Apr 99) Although its member states 
describe it as neither a military nor a defensive alliance, they have spent April 
preparing documents that redefine its "nature and objectives." GUAM has often 
been viewed as the anti-Russian bloc of the CIS. Meanwhile, Russia has 
completed the transfer of S-300 antiaircraft missile systems to Armenia and has 
negotiated a Russian military presence and base on Tajik territory. While both 
were carried out under CIS Collective Security auspices, they represent the 
strengthening of Russia's bilateral military ties with both countries. Uzbekistan's 
accession to GUAM, and Russia's new military deals with Tajikistan and Armenia 
may constitute the beginning of a renewed rift between GUAM+U and the 
Russian group including Belarus, Armenia, and Tajikistan. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Comrade! I've missed you! 
It took eight years and the NATO bombing of Serbia to find it, but Russia and 
Ukraine finally have an issue on which they agree -- separatism. Or, to put it 
more precisely, they have agreed to oppose "the spread of separatism." 
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During the last week, as Viktor Chernomyrdin took the lead negotiator's role for 
Russia, the two countries seem to have synchronized their proposals to end the 
Kosovo crisis, and come much closer in the process. Until Chernomyrdin arrived 
on 20 April, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma had been vigorously advancing 
his own "peace plan," which his administration said "differs from the position of 
Russia." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 9 Apr 99; nexis) In fact, on the day 
Chernomyrdin arrived, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk could find 
nothing more to say about the Russian peace proposal than, "Our stand 
coincides with Russia's in that it does not matter who ensures peace in the 
region." (ITAR-TASS, 20 April 99; nexis) At the same time, Ukraine had 
condemned the NATO airstrikes, but had also condemned Yugoslavian actions. 
 
Kuchma's three-stage plan called for "synchronous cessation" of hostilities on the 
part of both NATO and Yugoslav forces, an international UN- or OSCE-led 
peacekeeping force which would assist the refugees to return home, an 
expansion of the OSCE humanitarian mission, and broad autonomy for Kosovo. 
At that time, Kuchma's call for a synchronous halt to military operations meant 
that the Serbian army would withdraw "while" NATO ended its bombing. 
(INTERFAX, 15 April 99; nexis) The Russian plan called on NATO to stop 
bombing before Yugoslav forces would leave the Kosovo area. The Ukrainian 
plan -- as opposed to Russia's -- also clearly stated its opposition to Serbian 
ethnic violence against Albanians. 
 
During Kuchma's meeting with Chernomyrdin, however, those differences were 
apparently removed -- at least in public. Chernomyrdin is now talking about 
ending "ethnic purges in Kosovo" and allowing refugees to "return to their 
homes." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0847 GMT, 21 Apr 99; BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts/nexis) Kuchma, meanwhile, continues to push for the Serbian 
army's withdrawal from Kosovo, but now says that his plan is identical to 
Russia's. "Our positions fully coincide," he said on 23 April. "The problem can be 
resolved only through preserving Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, granting 
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Kosovo broad autonomy, halting military actions, and withdrawing the Serbian 
army from Kosovo." (REUTERS, 23 Apr 99; Russia Today) It is unclear if 
Kuchma was still speaking about a "synchronized" halt to military actions, or if 
the newly agreed upon Russian-Ukrainian plan now calls for a halt to military 
actions before Serbia withdraws, as his statement would imply. 
 
Both sides have also stepped up the rhetoric against separatism. Before NATO 
began airstrikes, Kuchma warned, "Separatism is a disease that is too quick to 
spread in the world...." (INTERFAX, 23 Mar 99; nexis) On 15 April, he called 
separatism "the 20th century's malaise." (INTERFAX, 1756 GMT, 15 Apr 99; 
FBIS-EEU-1999-0415) 
 
Chernomyrdin responded to Kuchma's statements by letting the world know that 
Russia wants to solve these types of problems in the future. "It is our first-priority 
task jointly to develop mechanisms for settling such conflicts not only in Kosovo, 
but also in other parts of the world," he said. (INTERFAX, 0952 GMT, 21 Apr 99; 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/nexis) Chernomyrdin curiously did not 
specify if that included areas of ethnic conflict within Russia itself -- or within 
Ukraine for that matter. 
 
Just say 'no' to NATO! And no to government cooperation, too 
Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko's calls for his fellow MPs to pull out of 
NATO have so far gone unheeded. Tkachenko has brought a bill that would 
"cancel" all legal agreements with NATO to the Ukrainian parliament floor at least 
three times in the last several weeks. Each time the measure fell at least 35 
votes short of the necessary 226 in favor. Before the votes, President Kuchma 
said that even if the vote passed, "this doesn't mean that the executive power will 
implement it." (INTERFAX, 1614 GMT, 5 Apr 99; FBIS-EEU-1999-0405) 
 
Comment 
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This statement exemplifies what has turned into a completely paralyzed 
government structure, with both the executive and legislative bodies unable to 
dislodge the other. Tkachenko has lashed out more and more frequently at the 
president, while Kuchma has blasted the parliament for "political bickering." Just 
days ago, he confirmed what observers of Ukraine have known for some time: "A 
tug of war between the legislative and executive power is taking place," he said. 
(REUTERS, 23 Apr 99; Russia Today) 
 
Every significant measure that has taken effect in Ukraine in recent months has 
done so through decree. The Ukrainian parliament has become more of a 
populist pulpit for candidates and parties than a governing body, while Kuchma 
has simply begun issuing decrees without consultation. 
 
From his statements to the press, it appears as if Kuchma believed that the 
measure to "cancel" NATO agreements (agreements put into effect by his 
presidential decrees) would pass. One of the main reasons for the surprising 
failure of the measure could have easily been the low number of deputies who 
came to vote: Over 100 deputies in the left-controlled parliament did not show up 
at "work" that day. 
 
However, during the same week, parliament passed a law that would have 
increased pensions paid by the government, thus increasing expenditures by 
over 10 billion hryvnyas. Kuchma vetoed the bill, noting that this would do 
nothing but increase arrears by 10 billion hryvnyas. Meanwhile, the IMF and 
World Bank continue to wait for the parliament to take action on privatization 
proposals. 
 
It appears they, and everyone else, may have to wait until 31 October, the date 
of the next presidential election. Given the recent swell of support for the leftist 
parties, there seem to be two choices for what the government will look like after 
that election. Ukraine will either see more of the same tug of war between the 
 20 
left-controlled parliament and the center-right president, or the country will 
witness the removal of the pull to the right entirely. 
 
In the meantime, Kuchma has refused to heed parliament suggestions to boycott 
the NATO 50th Anniversary Jubilee, and arrived as scheduled in New York on 22 
April to meet with Western leaders. 
 
BELARUS 
Nothing but a dictator 
As opposition activity continues to mount, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and 
his Belarusian KGB appear to have given up all pretense of democracy. The 
government has begun a systematic crackdown on all opposition figures, parties 
and movements. Perhaps most concerning is the complete lack of attention 
Lukashenka's actions are getting from Western countries. Although the attacks 
on individuals are difficult to quantify, particularly because of the difficult 
conditions under which the media in the country operate, Lukashenka/KGB 
operations in the last few weeks have ranged from arresting the leading 
opposition candidate for president to destroying files on computers at newspaper 
offices to arresting a youth opposition leader for handing out pamphlets. 
 
In early April, former Prime Minister Alyaksandr Chihir and several other 
members of the Belarusian "shadow parliament" were arrested -- many for the 
third or fourth time. Chihir is a candidate for president in the alternative 
presidential election being held on 16 May by the disbanded parliament. He was 
held in jail for several days, until he was finally charged with embezzlement. The 
arrest was condemned by a group of liberal Russian Duma deputies, who wrote, 
"The restriction of freedom of assembly, introduction of censorship in the mass 
media, liquidation of the legitimately-elected parliament -- all this indicates the 
establishment of a totalitarian state in Belarus." They continued, 
"Representatives of the ruling regime have not found courage to bring a political 
charge against him, inventing the false ground of financial wrongdoing.... We 
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demand immediate freeing of A. Chihir and other political prisoners in Belarus." 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 5 Apr 99; nexis) 
 
Meanwhile, KGB officials recently "questioned" Aleh Hruzdzilovich, a 
correspondent at the Naviny newspaper, after he published an internal 
government memo detailing KGB plans to derail the opposition. Hruzdzilovich 
said the memo listed "prevention and deterrence measures" against the shadow 
parliament members, which should be used to "cripple and compromise the 
opposition structures." The plan included arrests, stemming financing sources 
and cutting off support from Western diplomats in the area. (BELORUSSKAYA 
DELOVAYA GAZETA, 9 Apr 99, p. 3; FBIS-SOV-1999-0416) Hruzdzilovich 
included a denial from the National Security Council that the document was real 
in his report, but that was apparently not enough. 
 
Around the same time, former Interior Minister Yuri Zakharenko, who is also now 
a leading opposition member, was forced into hiding when an arrest warrant was 
issued for him. The prosecutor's office has charged Zakharenko with obstruction 
of justice for reportedly "forming a union of anti-Lukashenka police and army 
officers." (INTERFAX, 15 Apr 99; nexis) 
 
Meanwhile, the head of the opposition central election committee, Viktor 
Honchar, was forced to postpone a press conference about the upcoming 
election when, according to Belapan, "the police sealed off the building where the 
news conference was to be held. The electricity supply to the building was cut off 
allegedly for power grid repairs." (BELAPAN, 0930 GMT, 15 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0415) 
 
And finally, Yawhen Skochka, a 22-year-old organizer of a youth opposition 
group, was arrested and charged with "organization of or participation in group 
actions disturbing the peace." His crime: visiting 10 embassies in Minsk to deliver 
pamphlets titled "Belarus into Europe." If convicted, as expected, he could be 
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given a three-year prison term. (BELAPAN, 1320 GMT, 18 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0418) 
 
These activities follow mass arrests of opposition members in March, and 
repeated, systematic harassment of media in the country. However, these 
activities do not seem to have caused major concern in Western countries, which 
apparently are content to wait and see what happens, and let the opposition 
struggle forward alone. 
 
MOLDOVA 
No way to treat a neighbor 
Relations between Ukraine and Moldova took a downturn recently after Ukraine 
cut all electricity supplies to its neighbor. That decision, which came after 
Moldova had built up $40 million in debt, left 60 percent of the country with no 
electricity. The situation was compounded when Romania also suspended power 
supplies because of $9 million in debts. Moldova had been rationing power for 
months, with some users only having electricity for a few hours each day. 
However, the decision to cut off power completely appears to have taken the 
Moldovan government by surprise, and there does not seem to be any way that 
the debts can be paid, leaving President Lucinschi to request that Ukraine 
restore power for humanitarian reasons. So far, those requests have gone 
unanswered. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 7 Apr 99; nexis) 
 
Meanwhile, the Moldovan authorities have stopped a Ukrainian cargo plane in 
Chisinau, for suspected arms smuggling. The plane was traveling from Hungary 
to Yemen. It is the second time in one month that a Ukrainian plane has been 
stopped in Moldova on arms charges. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 9 Apr 99; 
nexis) 
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By Monika Shepherd 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Russian troops to occupy Tajikistan for 10 more years 
Perhaps much to their own surprise, United Tajik Opposition (UTO) Chairman 
Said Abdullo Nuri, Uzbek President Islom Karimov, and the leaders of 
Afghanistan's Taliban have found themselves to be political allies in regard to 
Russia's latest military agreement with Tajikistan. Despite these leaders' 
vehement protests, the Russian and Tajik defense ministers signed a treaty on 
16 April which grants Russia's military the right to establish a base on Tajik 
territory and to quarter troops from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division at that base 
for the next 10 years. Russian defense ministry spokesmen stressed that the 
agreement does not provide for the quartering of additional troops in Tajikistan, 
but merely for the construction of more permanent headquarters for the 6,000-
7,000 units already deployed there. In fact, Russian defense ministry officials 
stated that they would like to reduce those numbers somewhat, in order to 
decrease maintenance costs. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 17 Apr 99, pp. 1, 5; 
Defense and Security/nexis) 
 
Whether or not the Russian government decides to deploy additional troops in 
Tajikistan, the fact that Russia's military occupation of Tajik territory has been 
extended for another 10 years, regardless of continued progress in the inter-Tajik 
peace process or of changes in regional political stability, has drawn loud 
objections from the Tajik opposition, as well as from Uzbek and Afghan Taliban 
leaders. UTO Chairman Said Abdullo Nuri told journalists on 19 April that the 
new Russian-Tajik military treaty threatens Tajikistan's independence and 
undermines the development of the country's own armed forces. (VOICE OF 
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1600 GMT, 19 Apr 99; BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring/nexis) 
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Uzbekistan's president objected to the fact that he had not been consulted 
beforehand as to the treaty's necessity. He stated that the establishment of a 
more permanent Russian military base in Tajikistan will only help to destabilize 
the region even further and threatens the security of Central Asia as a whole. 
President Karimov expressed his concern that once the base has been set up, 
the Russian defense ministry will equip it with heavier and more modern 
weapons systems, which could provoke a violent reaction from the Taliban. 
(VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1530 GMT, 18 Apr 99; BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring/nexis, and SEGODNYA, 17 Apr 99, p. 2; What the Papers 
Say/nexis) 
 
The bulk of Russia's troops in Tajikistan are stationed near Dushanbe, 
Qurghanteppa (close to the Uzbek border), and Kulob (near the Afghan border). 
Russian defense ministry sources have said that the new base will most likely be 
built somewhere between these three cities. (INTERFAX, 0915 GMT, 15 Apr 99; 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring/nexis) Thus, it is not surprising that both the Uzbek 
and Taliban leaders are uneasy, faced with the prospect of a permanent Russian 
troop presence less than 60 miles from their borders. The Taliban's foreign 
ministry issued a statement accusing the Russian government of establishing the 
base in order to facilitate its intervention in Afghanistan's domestic affairs and 
appealed to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to prevent further Russian 
meddling. The fact that Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev met with General 
Ahmad Shah Mas'ud (leader of the main anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan) 
during his trip to Dushanbe in early April probably did little to reassure Taliban 
leaders of the peaceful, purely defensive nature of the recently signed Russian-
Tajik military treaty. (INTER-PRESS SERVICE, 22 Apr 99; nexis) 
 
The agreement to keep Russian troops in Tajikistan for an additional 10 years 
has dealt a severe blow to the Tajik government's credibility in the inter-Tajik 
peace process. The goal of this process is to establish a stable, independent, 
popularly elected government in Tajikistan which will be able to manage its own 
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affairs and provide for its own security. This is not likely to happen as long as the 
Tajik armed forces are so heavily dependent on Russian assistance for 
equipment, training, and the defense of their own borders. Furthermore, despite 
the Moscow government's repeated assertions that the units stationed in 
Tajikistan are neutral and under strict orders not to interfere in Tajikistan's 
internal affairs, the events of the past several years have made it clear that the 
troops are there to support President Rahmonov and his administration. This 
could make it very difficult for the UTO to force the current Tajik government to 
fulfill the remaining terms of the peace agreement's political protocol, not to 
mention what might ensue if President Rahmonov and his supporters lose in the 
elections scheduled for late 1999. 
 
The Tajik peace process could also be brought to a halt if the Uzbek government 
begins to intensify its interference in Tajik affairs, in what President Karimov may 
consider a justifiable response to the threat of a strengthened Tajik-Russian 
military alliance. In the past, the Uzbek government has used military, political, 
and economic means to exert pressure on President Rahmonov to include more 
Leninobodi (from Tajikistan's northernmost province) officials in the national 
government, as well as to lend more support to Uzbekistan's struggle to assume 
a leadership position in Central Asia. The prospect of a long-term Russian 
military presence in Tajikistan will no doubt greatly undermine Uzbekistan's 
efforts to control events in neighboring countries. Therefore it is not at all unlikely 
that the Uzbek government will undertake some type of retaliatory action, which 
could further destabilize not only Tajikistan, but perhaps other countries in the 
region. 
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